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Corporate investment decisions and stock price are correlated, because managers 
could gain information from stock price to help them make investment decisions. But 
stock price would reflect not only basic information about firms’ fundamentals but 
also noise, if stock price bubble exists. Morck，Shleifer 和 Vishny（1990） argue that 
stock price is possible to play a role of faulty active informant. When stock price 
includes a bubble component, stock price could convey false signals or noise to 
managers, and then corporate investment decisions would be distorted by noisy 
information from the stock price. 
This paper argues that managers know more information about firms’ 
fundamentals than outside investors because of information asymmetry. Hence, when 
managers try to obtain information from the stock price to help them make investment 
decisions, they are more likely to hear from the stock price market-aggregate 
information rather than firm-specific information. Therefore, corporate investment 
decisions will be influenced by market-aggregate noisy information that conveyed by 
the stock price. 
Following the method of Rhodes-Kropf，Robinson 和 Viswanathan（2005）, this 
paper further decomposes the stock price bubble into market-aggregate bubble and 
firm-specific bubble. Using market-aggregate price bubble to proxy for the 
market-aggregate noisy information, this paper examines the effects of 
market-aggregate price bubble on corporate investment decisions. 
This paper has the following findings: (1) investor sentiment can influence the 
market pricing of accounting information in short term, and hence results in 
market-aggregate stock price bubble; (2) as a proxy of market-aggregate noisy 
information, market-aggregate price bubble can significantly influence firms’ 
investment levels after controlling the effects of market timing and catering channels; 
(3) since firms with higher financial constraints tend to hold more cash , mangers of 















catering theory can used to explain the relationship between firm-specific price 
bubble and firms’ investment levels in China. 
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Morck，Shleifer 和 Vishny（1990）将股票价格称为一种错误的主动信息源。 
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